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Introduction: civil society in the Arab world 
Policy-makers and scholars consider the persistence of authoritarian rule in the 
Arab world as the most significant obstacle to international peace and stability, 
making democratisation a priority. With the failure of democracy by imposition, 
much greater attention is paid to non-military means of democracy promotion and the 
strengthening of civil society has come back to the top of the agenda. Thus, both the 
US and the European Union intensified their financial and political commitments to 
increase civil society activism in order to generate democratising pressures from 
below. Due to the relevant political role that that the international community assigns 
to civil society, it is no surprise that a number of recent publications deal with this 
topic.  
The concept and practical application of the term ‘civil society’, after enjoying 
a spell of academic popularity, had recently come under criticism. From a theoretical 
point of view, it seems that the concept is too vague and normative to be of much use 
when explaining complex processes of democratisation (Encarnacion, 2006; 
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Carothers, 1999/2000). From an empirical point of view, it emerges that the role 
assigned to civil society in undermining the regimes of Eastern Europe has been 
greatly exaggerated (Tempest, 1997). However, when it comes to the Arab world, the 
debate about the role, strength and normative value of civil society is still alive. First 
of all, the realm of civil society is the one where opposition politics currently takes 
place due to the weakness of political parties. Secondly, it is within civil society that 
Islamism is particularly active through a number of charitable activities and its 
political credibility is largely derived from its welfare work. Thirdly, international 
actors implement strategies of democracy promotion through the funding of civil 
society activism to achieve democratising goals. Finally, the ruling elites have 
invested the terrain of civil society in order to control it and incorporate it.  
Broadly speaking there are four views regarding the state and relative 
importance of civil society in the Arab World. The first view treats the concept of 
civil society as being exclusively a liberal normative one and argues that in the region 
such civil society is very weak and therefore unable to pressure the regime into 
making democratic reforms. There are only very few liberal-democratic civil society 
organisations that promote and defend democratic values (Yom, 2005) and the state is 
able to dismantle or co-opt them. The second view conceptualises civil society in 
neutral terms and argues that civil society activism is quite strong when Islamist 
groups are included. The argument is that civil society organisations do not have per 
se any normative liberal-democratic traits and do not necessarily promote liberal 
values. Civil society can be therefore strong and ‘uncivil’ at the same time and this is 
precisely what Berman (2003) argues with respect to Arab civil society given the 
overwhelming presence of Islamists, who have an anti-democratic ethos. The third 
view suggests that civil society has indeed been strengthening over the last decade, 
 4 
with a significant surge in the numbers of organisations being created. However, this 
is not necessarily a sign that the ruling elites are losing control of their own society. 
Quite the contrary is true, as many civil society organisations are largely creations of 
the state itself, while others are either beholden to the state or fully co-opted. This 
generates an artificial civil society where autonomy of action is limited (Wiktorowicz, 
2000). The fourth view suggests that civil society should indeed be treated as a neutral 
explanatory category, but it also suggests that Islamism should not be a priori treated 
as possessing an authoritarian nature (Brumberg, 2002; Cavatorta, 2006). It follows 
that the strength of civil society should be examined through the dynamics that occur 
between its different sectors. 
The four volumes under review broadly fit in these schools of thought and 
address issues that are prominent in the debates between all of them. At the same 
time, they challenge some received wisdoms of the scholarship of civil society and on 
the scholarship of its conceptualisation in the Arab world.  
 
Civil society dynamics under authoritarian rule  
Pratt examines the evolution of civil society activism in a number of Arab 
republics since independence and her analysis is concerned with explaining how 
authoritarian rule has been able to survive, using civil society as an explanatory 
variable. She claims that ‘the Arab world has failed to experience a transition to 
democracy not because civil-society actors do not support democracy, but because 
there does not exist a consensus that challenges the post independence hegemony 
underpinning authoritarianism’ (2007:189). Due to colonialism, civil society activism 
was intimately linked to the struggle for independence and to nationalism. Thus, the 
specific social or class interests of certain groups such as women, workers or 
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minorities were subsumed within the nationalist ideology. To a large extent this was a 
voluntary submission because they all shared the desire to be independent and ‘to 
construct a national identity and culture that was modern but not Western’ (2007:33). 
Civil society actors shared the objectives of modernisation, namely economic 
progress and anti-imperialism, and were therefore willing to sacrifice their particular 
struggles to achieve such objectives. Ultimately, this favoured the solidification of 
authoritarian rule because national identity and national unity became the primary 
referents for legitimate political action. In the name of national unity, dissent was 
labelled as anti-patriotic and therefore repressed. Once the project of post 
independence modernisation failed to deliver economic success, international equality 
and domestic social progress, civil society began to turn against the ruling elites. The 
problem is that such dissent did not coalesce around liberal and democratic notions. 
Thus, while, liberal and secular activism is now present in Arab civil society, the 
Islamists overshadow it. The pre-eminence of Islamism is due to its ability of re-
energising the modernisation impetus through religious precepts and symbolism. It 
follows that while the new civil society actors sharply criticise the authoritarianism of 
the political system, the dominant Islamist alternative largely proposes the same 
corporatist arrangements of the past, although underpinned by a different ideological 
referent. In the past, civil society organisations had subordinated ‘the welfare and 
rights of ordinary citizens to those of the national collective’ (2007:59). This is today 
unacceptable not because of the intrinsic deficiencies of such arrangements, but 
because they are not sufficiently strong. Thus they need to be strengthened and re-
infused with new vigour. This generates the current opposition to the ruling elites 
within civil society, but Pratt claims that this is not truly a challenge because a 
democratic counter-discourse has not been fully developed given the marginal role of 
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secular and liberal organisations. In fact, civil society activism remains very much 
linked to the necessity of rediscovering a unitary élan of modernisation that seems to 
have been lost throughout the years. This interpretation of the development of civil 
society activism leads to a number of considerations on the current situation. First of 
all, it explains the popularity of Islamic activism. While on the surface Islamism is in 
opposition to the current regimes, it offers simply a re-invention of previous 
corporatist arrangements, this time imbued with the traditional values of religiosity 
which will ensure against corruption and secular and individualistic tendencies. 
Islamism is popular because it offers ordinary citizens an ideological framework very 
similar to the one of post-independence nationalism within which the original goals of 
modernisation can be achieved. The example of the Algerian FIS presenting itself as 
the true heir of the anti-colonial struggle is still a valid illustration of how this process 
works. Thus, Islamism proposes a ‘catch-all’ discourse that replaces secular 
nationalism with a religious one, which is appealing to broad sections of the 
population irrespective of their social and individual status. The project of political 
Islam is a totalising one because it simply re-frames the conceptual categories which 
the previous national consensus was built on in religious terms. In addition, Islamist 
groups and associations are practically able to demonstrate that their ideological 
references are ‘concrete’ in so far as they provide for the welfare of citizens as much 
as the early nationalist elites were able to do immediately after independence. 
Through their networks of social activism, Islamists are able to offer a glimpse of the 
promise of the continuation of non-Western modernisation that ruling elites betrayed. 
Secondly, Pratt’s tracing of civil society development explains the limited appeal of 
secular and liberal groups. Their discourse is only marginally effective precisely 
because it does not offer ‘total’ solutions and because their idea of modernisation is 
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very much in line with a Western one. This cannot be very appealing at a time when 
Western policies do not enjoy much prestige and Western societies appear ‘a-moral’. 
Pratt’s contribution is interesting because it presents us with a ‘historical’ explanation 
for the inability of civil society to truly challenge authoritarianism in so far as the 
dominant counter-discourse, Islamism, is still imbued with notions of exclusivist 
identities. Islamists still pretend that the welfare and rights of citizens can be 
advanced only through a unitary project that does not accept deviations in the name of 
social and individual differences and needs. To a certain extent, Pratt’s work can be 
linked to the first school of thought mentioned above because it highlights the 
inability of a normative liberal notion of civil society to assert itself in the Arab world 
and to press for change. She recognises for instance the weakness and divisions that 
plague secular and liberal human rights associations and women’s groups. While heir 
work is both important and necessary to try to spread universal values of equality and 
individual rights, they are largely marginal actors. While not going as far as labelling 
Islamist groups as inherently anti-democratic, Pratt points to very real difficulties that 
opposition actors of a liberal and secular inspiration have in dealing with Islamists. 
The opposite is also true in that Islamist organisations have tremendous problems in 
finding common ground with secular civil society. From this, it follows that civil 
society, despite its strength, is currently unable to challenge authoritarian regimes in 
the name of shared democratic values. Finally, from a policy-making point of view, it 
means that the efforts of the international community to promote democracy through 
civil society activism are quite ineffective because the groups that enjoy the support 
of international actors have little domestic credibility and more often than not tend to 
cooperate with the regime, thus reinforcing their authoritarian grip on society. This 
view of civil society activism can contribute to explain the absence of meaningful 
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alternatives to the current regimes in power, although it is admittedly based on an 
‘ideal type’ categorisation of associations into Islamist and secular/liberal.    
The problem with this interpretation is the sharp distinction made between 
Islamist groups and non-Islamist ones. The reality is probably much more complex 
and Jamal’s book contributes to better understand it. Her research also deals with 
divisions among movements active within associational life, but she prefers the labels 
pro and anti regime groups. Jamal specifically analyses how civil society dynamics in 
authoritarian contexts lead to reinforce authoritarian rule and how an increase in trust 
and social capital has reverse effects on attitudes towards democracy. The literature 
on civil society postulates that democratic change stems from the close correlation 
that exists between a vibrant associational life, the generation of social capital and the 
growth of democratic values and attitudes. However, Jamal challenges this 
assumption and argues that associational life in authoritarian contexts is distinctively 
different from the one in established democracies. The dynamics that are produced in 
the relationships between authoritarian regimes and civil society organizations are 
fundamentally different despite the fact that similar trends, such as the increase in 
interpersonal trust among association members, exist in both authoritarian and 
democratic contexts. The argument, similar to the one of the third school of thought, 
is that the authoritarian constraints the regime put in place make it necessary for 
associations to decide which side they are on. If the association wants to achieve some 
of its objectives, it will have to play by the rules of the authoritarian regime. Thus, it 
is only through corrupt networks of patronage that the association will be able to 
satisfy the basic needs of its members and achieve its goals because only the regime 
can deliver the ‘goods.’ These networks however reinforce the central role of the 
authoritarian regime because they strengthen non-democratic access to decision-
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makers. Paradoxically, social capital increases within these pro-regime associations 
because their members, by playing within the constraints provided, can be reasonably 
certain of positive outcomes for the group, which then has no interest in dismantling 
such networks in favour of fairer and more democratic ways of access to decision-
makers because this would diminish their benefits. The opposite is also true and anti-
regime organisations, which do not utilise or do not have patronage networks 
available to them, have lower levels of social capital because of their more democratic 
values, which do not allow them to obtain the same level of benefits. The pro and 
anti-regime labels are probably more effective than the Islamist and secular/liberal 
ones because they better capture the personalistic nature of many these networks, 
which at times are much more significant than ideological differences. Jamal does not 
write off the difficult work of many autonomous anti-regime organisations, but civil 
society in the end does not produce democratisation because authoritarian dynamics 
provide a very rigid structure of incentives for associational life and do not permit the 
emergence of democratic attitudes. The policy-making implications of these findings 
point, once again, to the ineffectiveness of international democracy promotion 
strategies. As long as political systems in the Arab world remain authoritarian, civil 
society activism will not develop and will not play the same role as in established 
democracies. As long as material benefits to associations are distributed through 
regime-controlled corrupt networks, which reinforce patronage the threat of violence, 
very little can be achieved. Groups that benefit will not develop democratic attitudes 
and it is precisely those groups that the regimes count on for ensuring survival.  
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Islamism and civil society 
There is a considerable degree of consensus on the Islamist virtual dominance 
of associational life as Islamists are active in a wide number of fields. Irrespective of 
one’s normative views about Islamism, Islamic activism needs to be examined 
because it represents a crucial aspect of the vibrancy of civil society.       
The pre-eminence of Islamist organisations within civil society is at the centre 
of Clark’s volume, which can be loosely linked to the fourth school of thought. It 
examines Islamic social institutions and how they operate in the provision of social 
welfare. In a sense Clark explores in detail what Pratt has highlighted and she argues 
that ‘Islamic social institutions represent a moderate response not only to the secular 
state’s inability to provide social welfare services but against the secular state as well’ 
(2004:12) This ideological and teleological goal however has to contend with the 
structural realities and constraints of the environment surrounding Islamic 
organisations. Clark convincingly argues that these constraints make Islamist 
associations not so different to their secular counterparts. In this respect, the findings 
from the case studies challenge some received wisdoms precisely because 
organisations are examined as rational actors and not simply as ideological ones, 
unable to accept the ‘reality’ of their institutional, social and economic environment. 
There are three important conclusions that Clark makes. Firstly, while it is confirmed 
that Islamic social institutions are more active than their secular counterparts and, at 
times, more active than the state itself in providing welfare services, their activism 
does not present tangible Islamic ideological references. Thus, ‘there is no conscious 
attempt to create the foundations for an Islamic vision of society’ (2004:152). This 
means that the way in which Islamic charities are run responds more to demands of 
efficiency than to political or ideological requisites. Organisational matters, efficient 
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delivery of service and long-term sustainability the association itself are much more 
relevant than ‘planting the seeds of a new understanding of state and society’ 
(2004:152). The conventional wisdom that such Islamic institutions are a significant 
recruiting ground for the Islamist political project and that they are purely ideological 
actors bent on propagating a political message is proven wrong. These organisations 
are very much aware of the environment they operate in and make the necessary 
compromises in order to fulfil their primary objectives, which are not necessarily 
political. In fact what makes such institutions Islamic is simply the belief of many 
individuals involved that they ‘are promoting Islam through their work’ (2004:153). 
This means that Islamic institutions do indeed operate and socialise their members in 
much of the same way as it happens elsewhere and that they should be treated as 
rationalistic actors. The second important finding is that Islamic charities are very 
much a middle class product and are run by and for middle-class professionals. While 
Clark acknowledges that such charities do have programmes for the poor, their 
primary function is to employ and serve middle-class professionals and families that 
the state cannot or will not support. Against conventional wisdom again, the vast 
masses of poor and disenfranchised are not organically integrated in an Islamist 
political and social project. Rather, ‘the poor…are excluded from the social networks 
which lie at the heart of the Islamist movement’ (2004:154). If correct, this middle 
class bias is significant in two ways. First of all, it might undermine in the long term 
the commitment to radical social change of the Islamist movement because it can be 
accused of abandoning the reason which gives it popularity, namely the commitment 
to help the less fortunate. Secondly, it means that the ‘poor’ are largely up for grabs as 
a constituency and that political groups with a different ethos can be successful in 
attracting them if they can outperform Islamic charities in providing welfare. The 
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third finding is that Islamic charities are much more practical than expected when it 
comes to their relations with the regimes and use access to it to achieve their goals. 
Contrary to expectations, many Islamist groups operating as service-providers are 
dependent on the state because they need the regime’s cooperation on a number of 
issues such as licensing or building permissions. In this respect they privilege 
efficiency of action over futile confrontations that might hinder their capacity to act 
and therefore act rationally in order to advance the associations’ concrete goals. In 
many ways this also confirms Jamal’s point about associational life being somewhat a 
pillar of authoritarianism.   
Broadly speaking, the work of Beau and Graciet on Morocco fits in with the 
fourth school of thought on civil society activism because their examination of 
Islamism and secular associational life does not suffer from a priori assumptions 
about the democratic nature of the actors engaged in civic and political activism. 
When it comes to the analysis of Islamism ‘in action’ they seem to contradict some of 
the findings in Clark’s book. This applies in particular to the idea that Islamism is 
largely a middle-class phenomenon. In their survey of Morocco’s political, economic 
and social state of affairs, the two authors give considerable space to the operations of 
Sheikh Yassine’s Justice and Charity Group. From their analysis it emerges that many 
of the charitable associations linked to the group are indeed run by and for the 
professional Moroccan middle-class, which opposes the monarchy for its 
authoritarianism, corruption and inability to solve Morocco’s problems. However, 
many of the activities are not profit making and are run on a volunteer basis for the 
benefit of the very poor sections of the population. While the range of services might 
not be not of the same high quality as the one offered in the cases Clark addresses, 
such services are still crucial in attempting to lift men and women out of economic 
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distress and illiteracy. The focus is thus on literacy classes, job training and basic 
medical care. Thus, while it is probably true that even the Justice and Charity Group 
serves, to a certain extent, the professional needs of the middle class, the popularity of 
the Islamist movement indicates that their social work still carries considerable weight 
with the poor. This constituency in return rallies behind the more overtly political 
actions of the movement, such as marches, demonstrations or petitions. Evidence of 
the same kind can be found when one examines Islamist movements in Palestine or 
Lebanon. In the case of Morocco, Beau and Graciet argue that the ability to Islamicise 
society through charity and social work will inevitably have significant political 
consequences, namely a reduction of the Monarchy’s legitimacy and therefore the 
certainty that Islamism will eventually triumph. While this scenario might be overly 
pessimistic for the Monarchy, the influence of Islamism in Morocco should not be 
underestimated. Paradoxically, the surprisingly disappointing score of the Islamist 
Party of Justice and Development at the September 2007 legislative elections might 
be an indication that the societal Islamism represented by Sheikh Yassine’s 
association is indeed on the rise. Given the group’s uncompromising attitude towards 
current electoral consultations, the very poor turnout reflects well on the movement as 
a non-participant. It means that the attitude that the group has towards meaningless 
elections is widespread in society and that other means of political action, namely 
social work, are much more significant. The Moroccan situation might indeed be 
peculiar and odd when compared to other countries in the region, but Clark’s assertion 
that Islamism is purely a middle-class phenomenon does not take into account the still 
widespread appeal it exercises on the poor precisely because of the charitable work 
that Islamic social institutions do. Thus, the strength a of their social work and 
ideological discourse still has a ‘universal’ appeal and is capable of attracting 
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different social categories to its message of change. This does not necessarily 
undermine completely her analysis because Clark is correct in pointing out that the 
‘catch-all’ tendency of Islamist movements might not serve them well in the future 
due to the internal contradictions that such tendency generates. In conclusion, while in 
the long run and through their institutionalisation into political parties, this catch all 
trait may not be satisfactory for the electorate, at the moment it seems that Islamic 
civil society activism is still largely coherent and intent on projecting a message of 
unity through which the interests of the whole nation can be expressed because the 
creation of an Islamic state will provide the necessary institutional framework to 
represent and satisfy the needs of all social classes.  
 
Trends and directions 
 In-depth examinations of civil society dynamics and their impact on prospects 
of democratisation in the Arab world have been very much at the forefront of 
academic scholarship in recent years. The policy emphasis on the strengthening of 
civil society activism requires a better understanding of the role of civil society that 
goes beyond the traditional conventional wisdom, which sees a causal relationship 
between increasing civic vibrancy and demands for democratisation in authoritarian 
settings. The four volumes reviewed here provide such understanding in a number of 
aspects. 
 First of all, from all the studies it emerges that strengthening civil society 
activism is unlikely to lead to democratisation, although for slightly different reasons. 
Pratt argues that the secular and liberal democratic discourse is too marginal at the 
moment to be able to construct a mode of understanding state-society relations that is 
not potentially authoritarian. The main problem with this view is that it seems to 
categorise Islamism as inherently anti-democratic. While Islamism indeed produces a 
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hegemonic alternative discourse in the construction of an Islamic society where 
specific interests are subsumed to a renewed effort of non-Western modernisation, 
evidence suggests that more often than not it is secular and nominally liberal civil 
society that rallies to the authoritarian regime to stop political Islam from taking over. 
This is indeed a key, but often overlooked point in the current debate and contributes 
to explain what can be called the ‘paradox of strength’. In the face of similar 
authoritarian constraints, it would seem logical that all opposition groups within civil 
society would cooperate to bring about change. The vibrancy of associational life and 
the widespread criticism of authoritarianism should theoretically lead to an increase in 
democratic attitudes and behaviour, which, in turn, should lead to political reforms. 
However, co-operation and alliance-building between the two sectors of civil society 
on the basis of shared objectives and values occurs only rarely because of the sharp 
ideological conflicts that exist between Islamist and secular/liberal groups, which 
translate into radically conflicting policy preferences. This division is based on a 
fundamentally opposing objective. While Islamists wish to make Islam the central 
reference for policy-making, secular/liberal groups wish to take Islam completely out 
of politics. This means that there is no shared democratic discourse that can unite 
them because they have conflicting views on the values, if not the procedures, that 
should underpin the new society they all hope to create. This division allows 
authoritarian regimes to use ‘divide and conquer’ strategies in order to remain in 
power. The outcome is that too many secular and liberal groups have ‘proven too 
willingly to cooperate with local non democratic regimes’ (Cook, 2005:94).  
Jamal argues that fostering civic activism has a detrimental effect on democratisation 
because the authoritarian setting privileges pro-regime associations, which do not 
have any incentive in democratic change because they will lose their access and 
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therefore their material gains. Similarly, Clark contends that civil society activism, 
even of the Islamic tendency, tends not to greatly upset authoritarian structures 
because Islamic social institutions end up co-operating on many matters with the 
regime. Finally, Beau and Graciet conclude that fostering civil society activism would 
benefit only Islamist groups as they are the ones currently dominating society and the 
political consequences of their taking over the state might lead to a form of renewed 
authoritarianism. Thus, evidence from the Arab world seems to point to the absence 
of a link between civil society activism and democratisation; on the contrary, it seems 
that such activism is an advantage for the ruling elites. These findings legitimate the 
doubts that are being expressed in the wider literature on democratisation about the 
usefulness of civil society as an explanatory variable.   
 The second important aspect emerging from these volumes is the dominant 
role of Islamism. While this was to be expected, it is important to underline that 
Islamist movements are much less ideological than usually believed. While the 
members of these groups interpret their activism as a form of political work and the 
organisations themselves use their charity work as a showcase for their abilities, their 
everyday actions are very much informed by rationality. Thus, they compromise and 
cooperate with the regime and with other ‘opposition’ groups on ad hoc matters if this 
advances the interests of the association irrespective of significant ideological 
differences, although they never do so on a sustained basis. 
 Finally, a third aspect is the much stronger relevance of charity and 
developmental work than of sheer political activism. The appeal of Islamism is due to 
the social engagement of Islamist movements. While such charity work is certainly 
beneficial to the middle-class, it is also helpful for the poor, which then become 
attached to Islamism as a political project. This in turn allows Islamists to present a 
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coherent and unitary project of modernisation that incorporates the interests of all 
social classes. It is on this terrain where they have virtually no competition and this 
excludes other ideas and ideological references from being heard. 
 These three aspects have a considerable impact on how we can evaluate 
strategies of democracy promotion. The current strategy of international donors of 
attempting to empower those groups within society claiming to be of the same liberal 
inspiration is simply not working. Liberal and secular groups emphasising individual 
rights and procedural democracy do not reflect the preoccupations of the vast majority 
of the population. Not only they are out of touch with the masses, but they also tend to 
rally to the regime in order to halt the growth of Islamism, thereby betraying their 
supposedly liberal-democratic ethos. Finally, these groups are often accused of 
promoting western values and interests at a time when western policies in the region 
are highly controversial. The corollary of the current strategy is to avoid relations with 
Islamist movements, negating a priori their democratic credentials. This is done in the 
name of a combination of both ideological incompatibility and realpolitik necessities, 
but it achieves only the objective of further alienating such movements.  
 In light of the findings and analyses of the four volumes reviewed it seems that 
if achieving democracy, or at least a procedural version of it, were the objective of the 
international community, a fundamental policy shift should occur. There are two 
priorities that should be pursued. First of all, much stronger pressure should be put on 
authoritarian regimes themselves to reform rather than insisting on strengthening an 
associational life, which is ultimately ineffective. Much greater effort should be put in 
undermining the stability of authoritarianism in order to liberate society and let it 
organise accordingly. Secondly, emphasis should be placed in enhancing the 
developmental goals of civil society and therefore investing in associations promoting 
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and providing welfare. This would certainly include cooperating or at least offering to 
cooperate with Islamic institutions. While it might be difficult to channel funds to 
development-oriented organisations while undermining the stability of the 
authoritarian regimes, this should at least be attempted. Many would point out that 
such strategy, if successful, would deliver Islamism in power. This might indeed be 
true, but any outcome is more likely to be the expression of popular will than current 
arrangements. In addition, according to Clark’s study, there are two points to 
consider. First of all, Islamic social and political institutions are much more rational 
than believed, which means that cooperation with them could lead to moderation and 
compromise. Secondly, if the poor are really up for grabs as an electoral constituency, 
the victory of Islamism is by no means a foregone conclusion. 
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